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UNEXPLORED ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY*
RONALD J. ALLEN**
There was a time-quite a long time, in fact-when members of the
legal profession viewed legal institutions as self-contained, virtually her-
metically sealed organisms whose purposes could be ascertained and fur-
thered by internal self-examination. During this time doctrine reigned
supreme, and its grip extended over the entire domain, ranging from
those engaged in the most mundane practice to those engaged in the most
theoretical speculations about the legal system. To be sure, the realists
during the early part of this century mounted an assault upon the tradi-
tionally narrow conception of the legal system. Their efforts did not
much shake the legal system loose from this view of legal reality, how-
ever, and the realists were soon overwhelmed by the resurgence of posi-
tivism with its primary message that "the rule's the thing" while all else
is secondary.' The pervasiveness of the narrow conception of the legal
system is captured in an extraordinary way in a recent article by Judge
Richard Posner:
Such was the atmosphere of the Harvard Law School when I was a student.
With a handful of exceptions.., the faculty believed, or at least appeared to
believe, that the only thing law students needed to study was authoritative
legal texts-judicial and administrative opinions, statutes, and rules-and
that the only essential preparation for a legal scholar was the knowledge of
what was in those texts, and the power of logical discrimination and argu-
mentation that came from close and critical study of them. The difference
from Langdell's day-a difference that was the legacy of Holmes and the
legal realists-was that law now was recognized to be a deliberate instru-
ment of social control, so that one had to know something about society to
be able to understand law, criticize it, and improve it. The "something,"
however, was what any intelligent person with a good general education
* The lecture upon which this article is based was delivered on September 15, 1987, at a
Wasington University School of Law conference on "Original Intent and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments." This conference was the seventh in a series of eight conferences, sponsored by the
Center for Judicial Studies, exploring the original intent and current interpretation of key provisions
in the Bill of Rights. The article is printed here with the permission of the Center for Judicial
Studies, Washington, D.C.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
I. See, eg., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEIT OF LAW (1961).
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and some common sense knew; or could pick up from the legal texts them-
selves (viewed as windows on social custom); or, failing these sources of
insight, would acquire naturally in a few years of practicing law: a set of
basic ethical and political values, some knowledge of institutions, some ac-
quaintance with the workings of the economy.2
The narrow conception of the law has come increasingly into disfavor
in the last two decades for a number of reasons. The first, and perhaps
most important, is the increasing democratization of virtually all institu-
tions in the United States, including legal institutions. On the one hand,
this is the inevitable result of the law extending further and further into
everyday affairs. As that occurs, the law not only affects, but is affected
by, everyday life, which reduces its insularity. On the other hand, the
democratization of the legal system is simply another example of the in-
creasing skepticism with which claims of privilege are met in our society.
Doctors no longer behave in a dictatorial fashion towards their patients;
rather, they explain in detail the treatment options that are available and
assist the patient in making a choice. The claims of organized religion of
having superior access to wisdom and godliness carry less weight. The
Catholic church in the United States in particular is learning this fact as
a result of the lay revolt against its teaching on various issues. Similarly,
the legal system, and its claims of special privilege, are subject to increas-
ingly intense scrutiny by the lay public and by its representatives in the
legislative branches of government. Tort reform is the most current, but
by no means the only, example of exogenous forces being brought to bear
upon the legal system.
There are other factors at play, as well. Related academic disciplines
have expanded their reach and provided insightful analyses of legal insti-
tutions. Economics, literary theory, and philosophy are the most influen-
tial disciplines right now, but political theory, psychology, game theory,
history and sociology, among many others, also have made, and are con-
tinuing to make, important contributions to our understanding of legal
institutions. The interdisciplinary barriers between law and related disci-
plines are breaking down, and an educated lawyer must now have a thor-
ough grounding in subject matters that a short time ago would have been
viewed as unnecessary for, if not alien to, the study of law.
One might wonder what this has to do with the right to trial by jury.
After all, the great battles between the economists and their adversaries
2. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV.
761, 763 (1987).
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are being fought over such issues as anti-trust policy and the nature of
the tort system, not over matters dealing with provisions in the Bill of
Rights providing for jury trials. Similarly, scholars who use philosophy
and political theory to address the debate over competing conceptions of
the constitutional vision do so on a grand scale. Their implications have
not reached the level of such housekeeping matters as the form of trial.
While the right to trial by jury, in both its sixth and seventh amend-
ment forms, may be primarily a matter of housekeeping, certain intrigu-
ing aspects make it ripe for consideration from a broader perspective that
is evident in much legal scholarship today. The right to trial by jury is
one of our most democratic institutions, and it complements-perhaps
even sustains-the continuing democratization of the country. More in-
triguing still, the right to trial by jury occupies one of the important in-
tersections of law and common affairs. Its existence breaks the isolation
of the law by mandating that outcomes in trials be determined by indi-
viduals extraneous to the system. Consequently, the law must explain
itself to such individuals, and is affected by the decisions that they reach.
Those decisions, presumably, are the product of the values and the
thought processes that individual jurors bring to their task, but this state-
ment opens up the institution of trial by jury to the probing eyes of all the
law's sister disciplines. What, exactly, are the values that jurors bring to
their task? How should they affect the outcome of cases? Should jurors
bring those values to the fore in deliberations or should they be en-
couraged to suppress their personal values and apply instead the values
of the legal system as explained to them by judges? Does it even make
sense to talk about the jurors' suppressing their own values? How does
rational thought progress if not from a stable matrix formed from the
experiences and beliefs of particular individuals? What does it mean to
deliberate and how does it occur? Does it matter how it occurs or is this
an issue that is better left unexamined? What if we discovered, for exam-
ple, that the views of women are less forcefully presented in juries with a
mix of males and females than they would be in a group composed of all
females?
Numerous issues integral to the right to trial by jury may be enlight-
ened from a perspective extraneous to the law, and indeed work is pro-
ceeding on many of these issues. I will discuss some of that work here.
In addition to arguing that lawyers have much to learn from other disci-
plines that will enlighten us about the implications of the right to trial by
jury, I will press the related point that the failure to think carefully about
1988]
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this right and to employ all the tools available within our culture has
resulted in the legal system reaching some curious positions, if not mak-
ing outright mistakes. The deep structure of my argument, though,
should by now be clear. The right to trial by jury poses fundamental
questions about the nature and structure of the legal system.
I want to explore briefly two areas. The first is the nature of evidence,
and the second is the nature of deliberation.
Beginning an analysis of the right to trial by jury with an.inquiry into
the nature of evidence may seem a bit odd, but it is the best place to
begin. Under the current conception of trial by jury, jurors hear evidence
and decide cases based upon that evidence. Thus, the nature of evidence
is a crucial variable underlying the right to have a trial by jury based
upon that evidence.
Evidence is that which the parties produce at trial, and based upon
what is produced-and only what is produced-the jurors are to decide
the case. Such is the standard conception of evidence, but how convinc-
ing or powerful a concept is it? Take a somewhat crude, but nonetheless
interesting example. When witnesses testify at trial, they normally do so
through the spoken word. To understand what the witness says, one
must understand what the words mean that the witness is employing.
Yet, the meaning of the various words spoken by witnesses will rarely
itself be the subject of evidence at trial. How, then, is it possible for the
jurors to decide the case based solely upon what is produced as evidence?
Obviously, it is not. Instead, the decision matrix must include the lan-
guage skills of the jurors, and only in the unusual case will the language
of witnesses be the subject of inquiry at trial. This recognition, though,
requires a significant modification of the general principle that the jury
decides based only upon what is produced at trial.
Press the matter further. Suppose a witness testifies that the light was
red when the defendant's car went through it, and suppose further that
the case is one of negligence premised upon the running of a red light.
Does this testimony establish the plaintiff's case so that a decision in the
plaintiff's favor can now be rendered? Of course not, but why not? The
answer is that for an untold number of reasons this testimony may be
false, meaning not consistent with objective reality. Yet how is a jury to
know whether the testimony is true or false? Again, the answer seems
obvious, but its obviousness hides a profound point. The jury will judge
this testimony in light of the jury's experience and background. Does the
witness appear to know what the word "red" means? Is there anything
[Vol. 66:33
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about this witness that suggests he is lying? Was he squirming on the
stand, or does he have an interest in the case? Does his testimony make
sense from the perspective of the jury? And of course the opposing side
must have an opportunity to demonstrate that the witness is in error for
one reason or another. That will be done by the presentation of further
evidence that, like the evidence of the plaintiff, will be assessed in light of
the jurors' backgrounds and experiences in life.
Like language, the jurors' experiences and perspectives are crucial
variables in determining the effect of the words that a witness speaks at
trial, and like language they will not be the subject matter of evidence
themselves. In fact, jurors are typically instructed to take their experi-
ence into account in deciding cases and to exercise their judgment. Yet
another large qualification must now be added to the principle that the
jury is to decide the case based upon what is produced at trial. What is
produced at trial is but the tip of a very large iceberg, and while impor-
tant, it is no more so than the great bulk of the iceberg lying below the
surface. Indeed, has not our basic conception of evidence been thrown
into doubt? Our initial conception focused on the act of producing some-
thing at trial, yet now we are driven to see evidence not as a thing pro-
duced at trial but instead as the result of an interactive process between
what is produced at trial and the jury. Evidence, in other words, is
whatever influences a jury on propositions material to a case. What will
influence a jury, however, is a function of how each juror uses his or her
background and experience to analyze what the parties produce.
Interestingly enough, the law recognizes this point. It does so by per-
mitting the parties to litigate a case at virtually any level of generality
they like. Thus, if the plaintiff in our hypothetical was concerned that
the jury may doubt whether the witness knows the difference between red
and green, he may produce evidence on the matter. In such a fashion,
the parties may decide how much to particularize the case. The more
they particularize the case, the larger the tip of the iceberg becomes; and
the less they particularize the case, the smaller the tip is.
Redefining the concept of evidence as I have done poses some very
difficult problems directly related to the concept of trial by jury. If evi-
dence is whatever influences a jury, the only way to know whether some-
thing is evidence or not is to present it to the jury and see what happens.
If that is so, however, a substantial portion of the law of evidence be-
comes obsolete, including what many consider its most important aspect,
the requirement of relevancy.
19881
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Under the rules of evidence, only relevant evidence is admissible, and
the judge determines relevancy as an initial matter. Relevancy, in turn,
is defined as evidence which increases or decreases the chance of some
legally operant (material) proposition being true. If, however, one can
know the effect of evidence only by observing how the jury responds to it,
what warrant is there for judges to exclude evidence from trial? Rele-
vancy can only be determined in light of what a jury does; what a judge
thinks, ironically, is irrelevant.
There seems to be a substantial incompatibility between the role of the
judge and the jury. This incompatibility stems from the interesting fact
that we apply quite different epistemological theories to these two actors
in the legal system. The jury system is based upon a relativistic or com-
munitarian theory of knowledge. Community consensus determines
what is true for purposes of after the fact determinations. Knowledge
emerges, in a sense, from shared norms and the community structure.
This, by the way, is not a new idea. During the period of Jacksonian
democracy, considerable strictures were placed upon the judiciary, par-
ticularly in the states, with respect to fact finding. This was done explic-
itly because of the concern that judges, being an elite, would bring their
peculiar perspectives to bear upon the fact finding process. Thus, even if
only unconsciously, fact finding would be skewed toward the values and
views held by an elite body. To discourage that from happening, states
required that fact finders be drawn from an ever widening pool and thus
the judges' ability to affect the process of fact finding was seriously re-
duced. At a very early time in our history, we recognized, in the context
of right to trial by jury, what philosophers of science such as Ernest
Nagel and Thomas Kuhns,3 and students of epistemology such as Rich-
ard Rorty, Mary Douglas and W.V. Quine,4 have pressed upon us during
this century. Knowledge emerges from community discussion and
consensus.
We apply a quite different theory of knowledge to judges, however.
The only justification for permitting judges to exclude evidence on rele-
vancy grounds is to advance accuracy in outcome. Whether the doctri-
nal reason for exclusion is a lack of probative value, waste of time, or any
of the other criteria contained in Federal Rules of Evidence 401 or 403,
3. E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE (1961); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIEN-
TIFC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
4. R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE
WEB OF BELIEF (1978); M. DOUGLAS, How INSTrTUTIONs THINK (1986).
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the basis for exclusion is factual accuracy. The admission of evidence is a
waste of time, for example, only when its admission will not influence the
jury toward a factually accurate outcome. Yet stringent conditions must
be satisfied before a judge can exclude evidence upon this or any other
ground. The judge must first know the correct outcome of the trial. Sec-
ond, he or she must accurately gauge how the jurors will react to this bit
of evidence in light of how they have reacted to all the other evidence in
the case.
There are two problems with this view. The first is that it requires the
judge to make decisions that no human is competent to make. The sec-
ond is that it fundamentally rejects the epistemological basis of trial by
jury by replacing the communitarian norms bolstering it with an objec-
tive theory of knowledge of the sort found in older writers such as Berke-
ley 5 and to some extent in the writings of Mortimer Adler.6 In this view,
the universe is knowable by human effort, and knowledge corresponds to
what exists in fact.
I do not intend to mediate between these views here. I only intend to
highlight their incompatibility and demonstrate some of the inconsisten-
cies that have emerged in the treatment of these related institutions. The
first such inconsistency has been mentioned already. From the point of
view of the theory of juries, judges are never justified in excluding evi-
dence.7 In addition, no reason exists to consign juries to a passive role.
The theory underlying trial by jury leads in the direction that the jury
should be an active participant in the evidentiary process by informing
the parties of what it wants to hear. After all, it is that body that will
decide the significance of evidence in light of its background and experi-
ence. Accordingly, the jury should be in a feedback relationship with the
parties, whereby evidence is received by the jury and feedback given to
the parties that will generate more evidence in light of the jury's reaction
to the first offer.'
Of course, if one is not convinced by this cornmunitarian theory and
5. A. GRAYLING, BERKELEY: THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS (1986).
6. M. ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES, 83-107 (1985).
7. See, e.g., TILLERS, MODERN THEORIES OF RELEVANCY (forthcoming) (reprinting IA WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE, § 37 (Tillers rev. 1961)).
8. This process is somewhat akin to some descriptions of certain continental systems. See,
eg., Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985). It is not
clear to me, however, whether such descriptions can be taken at face value. Allen, Koeck,
Riechenberg & Rosen, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and
Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship 82 N.U.L. REv. (forthcoming) (1988).
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believes that the world really is concrete and knowable, and further be-
lieves that judges have a relative advantage over juries in appraising the
conflicting stories of litigants, then why have juries?
This basic conflict between the theory of judges and the theory of ju-
ries, and the underlying conflict as to whether truth is objective or ema-
nates from human beings, also affects the decision of cases. A perfect
example is the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois.9
The question in Pope was whether the jury should be instructed to em-
ploy community standards in deciding the third prong of the Miller v.
California 10 test of obscenity. The test requires the trier of fact to deter-
mine whether the litigated work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. The Court said that: "The proper
inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community
would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in alleg-
edly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such
value in the material, taken as a whole."
11
This standard is virtually incomprehensible; and if it is not incompre-
hensible, it is inordinately silly. Jurors for the most part will be volun-
tary members of the community from which they are drawn, and
presumably will generally share the values of that community. To the
extent that is true, the values of the reasonable person from a community
and community values will be virtually identical. Thus, as the dissent
pointed out, the Court seems to be asking for a juror to find that ordinary
members of his or her community are not reasonable.12 To be sure, room
exists within communities for reasonable disagreement about matters, in-
cluding artistic value, but that raises more problems than it resolves.
First, how does one know how large a segment of the population must
hold a view for the view, or those holding it, to be reasonable? In a
footnote, the Court said that "Of course.., the mere fact that only a
minority of a population may believe a work has serious value does not
mean the 'reasonable person' standard would not be met." 3 Similarly,
the dissent suggested that the first amendment applies if "some reason-
able persons could consider it as having serious ... value."14 What if a
9. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
10. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
11. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921..
12. Id. at 1926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1921 n.3.
14. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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minority of one-the author of the disputed work, for example-believes
it has serious value? Is that enough to make the judgment reasonable?
Or, better yet, what if the author does not think highly of the work, but
some not yet extant being might? Indeed, who is to know how tastes
may change over time? The point is, of course, that if one goes from a
presumably majoritarian "community standard" to a standard based
upon the views of a real or hypothetical minority, one has to know both
how large a minority is sufficient to make views held by those individuals
reasonable as well as how to identify the relevant minority.
Perhaps this numerical approach to the question is not the proper way
to proceed. Rather than determining the size of the group that thinks
that a work has value, the jury could decide if anybody held such a view
and then decide if the person so holding that view is reasonable. How
would the jury do that, though? The only way in which the jury could
judge the reasonableness of some person is to judge that person by refer-
ence to some standard. Absent an instruction to the contrary, the stan-
dard employed will be the background and experience of the jurors, a
background and experience that together with that of other community
members forms the community standards that the Court was trying to
avoid. 15
Where did the Court go wrong? I cannot say for certain, of course,
but my sense is that it failed to recognize that it was attempting to fash-
ion a substantive rule designed to increase the protection for literary
works by manipulating the thought processes of jurors. In other words,
it appears as though the Court believes that obscenity is an objective fact
that exists independently of communities, but it is attempting to provide
first amendment protection through the mechanism of community deci-
sion making. The two are incompatible. If obscenity is a fact with a
concrete reality, then its attributes need to be defined for and provided to
the fact finder. If obscenity is a value of a community, then the only
question is what is the relevant community. Had the Court, and more to
the point the lawyers for the parties, attended more carefully to the un-
derlying epistemological concerns, this mistake might have been avoided.
The second general area relating to the right to trial by jury that I wish
to address is the nature of deliberations. It seems somewhat remarkable
that there is virtually no law related to the deliberative process of juries.
15. This circularity may explain why Stevens just gives up the effort and concludes that the
state cannot criminalize the possession of obscene material. Id. at 1927.
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This is remarkable because the deliberative process is one of the most
crucial aspects of trial by jury, and for that reason alone one would think
that there would be periodic attempts to regulate it in one fashion or
another. To the contrary, though, the country has a uniform rule that
what goes on in the jury room is inviolate from both ends. We don't
instruct the jury on how to deliberate, and we don't inquire into how
they did so when they have finished.
The traditional approach to deliberations certainly is supported by
weighty considerations. There is a great value in having a black box into
which we can pour our problems and out of which we can get decisions.
Nonetheless, I wonder if that black box should remain inviolate even
from advancing knowledge that may raise serious concerns about the na-
ture of the deliberative process. It is one thing to impose a blanket impo-
sition of inquiry or direction on an institution when there is no reason to
doubt its fairness (even if there is no reason but experience to trust it).
But it is another to do so when data begins to collect that casts some
doubts on the matter. Such data has begun to collect, although it has for
the most part been studiously ignored to date by the legal system. The
most striking data has to do with the interactions of males and females in
small groups, and it is to that issue that I direct my remarks. 16
Suppose you wanted to construct a deliberative process that involved
widespread participation, the goal being to involve all the members of the
relevant group. Suppose further that you discovered that within the rele-
vant group there were at least two identifiable subgroups the members of
which tended to approach problems from quite different perspectives,
and thus tended to appraise the same evidence in quite different ways
frequently drawing different inferences. Perhaps your initial thought
would be that such a finding reconfirms the value of your primary goal of
encouraging widespread participation by the group. Because you define
the group as a single unit and want a group decision, that decision should
be an amalgam of the constituent parts of the group. Thus, to the extent
there are different ways of approaching problems within the group, open
and thorough deliberations are to be encouraged in order to obtain a
decision that emerges from the blending of the various views. Indeed, so
far it sounds like this is a prescription for trial by jury, but what if you
found out that it doesn't work this way? What if you found out that the
16. I am indebted to the excellent student piece Note, General Dynamics and Jury Delibera-
tions, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987) for having been the catalyst to my thoughts on this problem.
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members of one of those two groups tends to be overly deferential to the
other, or at least do not pursue their own views as aggressively? Or,
what if you found out that the members of one group tend to speak con-
siderably less when in contact with the other group than they would if
deliberating by themselves? Would you view such matters as problems
to be corrected? If so, we must modify trial by jury, because very good
evidence supports the view that men and women react to each other
along these lines.
Psychologists using mock juries have found that men make considera-
bly more contributions to deliberations than women,17 a finding consis-
tent with the implications of research done in the field of small group
dynamics:
... studies show that men speak more often, at greater length, and are more
likely to interrupt other speakers than women. One effect of this male be-
havior is that women's silences lengthen as men interrupt, overlap, or give a
delayed or minimal response to the female speaker. One obvious way to
maintain power in a group is to monopolize and control discussion. Those
who have the power can do the talking; those who lack power must do the
listening. 18
In the context of juries, the male exercise of control is furthered by the
selection of the foreman, which is virtually always a male.
If the gender bias were just a gender bias carrying with it no secondary
consequences, it would be bad enough, but there are secondary conse-
quences here. Men and women tend to interact differently, have differing
perspectives on the same event, and share those perspectives in differing
ways. Data show, for example, that men tend to overestimate a witness'
ability to identify a suspect more than women do, women tend to recall
better than men information about female victims, and women attempt
more than men to accommodate differing points of view among members
of a group.19 Most important of all, in all women groups the more active
speakers attempt to draw out the more reticent, whereas in all male
groups the more active participants ignore the less active, and "[i]n
mixed groups... the women consistently [become] more silent."2° Thus,
important perspectives on "reality" may be lost or slighted in jury
deliberations.
17. Id. at 595-596.
18. Id. at 597-598.
19. Id. at 601-603.
20. Id. at 603.
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I cannot rehash here all the wonderfully complex findings that the so-
cial sciences are now generating, but it is becoming increasingly well-
documented, and it certainly seems intuitively correct, that jurors do not
undergo mystical transformations when they enter the jury room.
Rather, they take a good part of their cultural baggage with them. In
many respects that may be precisely what we want them to do. But do
we want matters of social hierarchy and status to affect deliberations over
facts? Should males, or any other segment of society have their views
overrepresented on juries as they are in other aspects of life? Or, should
we attempt to compensate for such matters in some way?
We could, for example, instruct jurors on small group dynamics, and
by doing so encourage the more aggressive to pay more attention to the
less aggressive among them. We could actively encourage the selection
of women as fore"men." Or, we could even affect the environment
within which jurors deliberate. Jury rooms invariably have rectangular
tables, but rectangular tables are both a sign of and conducive to hierar-
chy. Those in authority sit at the ends of such tables, and those who are
more submissive sit elsewhere. Jury studies have found, for example,
that men almost always sit at the end of the tables, and the women sit in
the middle.2 Why not use circular tables? Indeed, why not use circular
tables and encourage the jury to periodically canvass the views of each
member by going around the table?
One reason we may not want to do so is that it would inject what some
might call "artificialities" into the jury process, and if an "artificiality" is
anything that differs from what would occur if some variable is not influ-
enced, then indeed such proposals would be guilty of the charge. None-
theless, the same would be true of any variable at any time. Before the
jury room is furnished, it has neither a circular nor a rectangular table.
Before the jury is instructed, it has no instructions. Before the jury en-
ters the room, it is appropriate, it seems to me, to think about whether
we want to encourage or discourage its members from mirroring society
in all respects.
There are numerous issues still to be considered that would emphasize
the fact that the jury system is a crucible for the development of knowl-
edge in our society. For example, consider the remarkable strains on the
system imposed by the recent development of toxic tort litigation and the
21. Id. at 595.
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resultant epidemiological studies relevant to causation.2 2 How are such
issues to be resolved, and can juries be expected to be able to provide
"rational" answers in such cases? If they can not, how is such a conclu-
sion to be rationalized with the increasing democratization of our institu-
tions? Such conflicts are already evident in the legal system. Indeed, on
the one hand the Federal Rules of Evidence eliminate virtually all barri-
ers to the admission of evidence, and on the other, Judge Weinstein, in
the Agent Orange Litigation, refused to give a very important, controver-
sial, and complex case to the jury.2 3 I am not suggesting that either the
Federal Rules or Judge Weinstein was wrong, but only that we should
think about this issue and many others as well. In doing so we should
employ whatever tools we are fortunate enough to find, regardless of
whether they traditionally have been found in the workshop of the law or
elsewhere.
22. See, eg., In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), discussed infra, text accompanying note 23.
23. Id.
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